Indo Pak History-5

The 1970 elections were postponed from October to December due to heavy floods that caused immense destruction and havoc in East Pakistan. The sheer enormity of the disaster attracted worldwide attention. This gave Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman a golden opportunity to have an international audience for his anti-West Pakistan feelings, which he accused of brutal callousness. The Awami League gained much sympathy and benefit out of this suffering, and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and his people were portrayed on the international scene as victims of West Pakistan’s indifference.

In the general elections held in December 1970, the Awami League achieved an overwhelming victory. They captured 167 seats, the highest number in East Pakistan and overall. In the West, the Pakistan Peoples Party had won 85 seats. The way was now open to draw up a new Constitution.

The Awami League, now overwhelmingly victors, stood firm on its Six Points plan and refused to compromise on that issue. The Peoples Party in the West maintained that the Six Points Program did not really permit a genuine federation. It was in fact a unique constitutional proposal that proposed a federation that had power only over defense and foreign policy.

Efforts were made to start a constitutional dialogue and narrow the differences between the two Wings, but all in vain. Mujib-ur-Rahman’s adamant stand in support of his Six Points, and his proposal that East Pakistan should have a sovereign status independent of Pakistan, further aggravated the situation.

Mujib-ur-Rahman launched a non-cooperation movement. The civil administration was totally paralyzed. All government and educational institutions were closed. People were asked not to pay any taxes. The transport system came to a standstill. Factories and shops were shut. All government activities between both the Wings ceased. The Awami League setup a parallel government. Gangs of local Awami League freedom fighters, known as Mukti Bahini, led violent demonstrations and howled racial and anti-West Pakistan slogans, inciting the people to more violence.

Amidst these disturbances, Genaral Yahya decided to convene the National Assembly in March 1971. But Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman unexpectedly put forward other demands such as the immediate lifting of Martial Law and power transfer to the elected representatives of the people, prior to the National Assembly session.

Unfortunately, on March 23, the Republic Day of Pakistan, the Awami League declared “Resistance Day” and Bangladesh flags flew all over the Province. There was a great massacre. East Pakistan had reached a point of no return. To quash the armed rebellion of Awami League militants, the Pakistan Army struck its first blow on March 27, 1971. Yahya Khan chose to use force to bring law and order in the country.

In the meantime, India exploited Pakistan’s dilemma to the full. It sought to wring full propaganda and strategic value for itself out of the Bengali suffering and misery. India launched an attack on East Pakistan on November 22, 1971. The use of modern Soviet missiles, geographical separation by a thousand miles lying across the hostile Indian territory, and the collusion of Mukti Bahini and the Indian Army, made Pakistan’s military defeat in the East almost certain.

On December 10, 1971, the first feeler for surrender in East Pakistan was conveyed to the United Nations. On December 17, 1971, a formal surrender was submitted and accepted. Forty five thousand troops and an almost equal number of civilians of West Pakistan were taken as prisoners of war.

The text of the Instrument of Surrender document was as follows:

“INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER”

The PAKISTAN Eastern Command agree to surrender all PAKISTAN Armed Forces in BANGLA DESH to Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA, General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and BANGLA DESH forces in the Eastern Theatre. This surrender includes all PAKISTAN land, air and naval forces as also all para-military forces and civil armed forces. These forces will lay down their arms and surrender at the places where they are currently located to the nearest regular troops under the command of Lieutenant- General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA.

The PAKISTAN Eastern Command shall come under the orders of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA as soon as this instrument has been signed. Disobedience of orders will be regarded as a breach of the surrender terms and will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war. The decision of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA will be final, should any doubt arise as to the meaning or interpretation of the surrender terms.

Lieutenant- General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA gives a solemn assurance that personnel who surrender will be treated with dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with the provisions of the GENEVA Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of all PAKISTAN military and para-military forces who surrender. Protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of WEST PAKISTAN origin by the forces under the command of Lieutenant- General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA.

Signed:

(JAGJIT SINGH AURORA) Lieutenant-General General Officer Commanding in Chief Indian and BANGLA DESH Forces in the Eastern Theatre

(AMIR ABDULLAH KHAN NIAZI) Lieutenant-General Martial Law Administrator Zone B and Commander Eastern Command (PAKISTAN)

16 December 1971″

The surrender led to the disintegration of East and West Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh. After 25 years, the East Pakistanis declared themselves independent and renamed their Province as Bangladesh. Pakistan finally recognized Bangladesh at the Islamic Conference in Lahore on February 22, 1974.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes President [1971]

After the disastrous war with India that ingloriously concluded in December 1971, Pakistan had to face its greatest crisis since Independence. The dismembered Pakistan was left only with the four Provinces of West Pakistan; Punjab, Sindh, N. W. F. P. and Baluchistan. East Pakistan was now independent. Pakistan had lost a whole province of 70 million, 56 percent of the total population, and over 54,501 sq. miles of territory. There were 93,000 prisoners of war in India and Bangladesh. Pakistan’s international credit was depleted.

President Yahya tried to act in a militaristic manner to impose law and order but the people’s patience had been exhausted by this time. Military leadership had been discredited. Disillusionment, uncertainty and pessimism prevailed. People were no longer prepared to tolerate misgovernment. The public severely criticized and accused President Yahya and his Government for ineptness and inability that culminated with the 1971 national debacle.

Faced with these difficulties, President Yahya ceded power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party that had won the majority votes in the 1970 elections in West Pakistan. On the request of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, on December 6, 1971, Yahya Khan installed a civilian setup at the Centre and Nurul Amin, a prominent Bengali politician who was against Mujib-ur-Rahman, was made the Prime Minister. Z. A. Bhutto was made Deputy Prime Minister on the same day. Nurul Amin remained Prime Minister till December 20, 1971, the day when Bhutto took over as the civilian Chief Marshal Law Administrator.

A Pakistan International Airline flight was sent to fetch Bhutto from New York, who at that time was pleading Pakistan’s case before the United Nations Security Council on the East Pakistan Crises. Bhutto returned home on December 18, 1971. On December 20, he was taken to the President House in Rawalpindi where he took over two positions from Yahya Khan, one as President and the other as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Thus he was the first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator of the dismembered Pakistan.

The new President inherited a disturbed and desperate nation sobbing and suffering from an intangible loss of confidence. In this dismal hour, he addressed the nation and promised to fight back. He vowed to build a new Pakistan.

Bhutto’s intentions to restore national confidence were in several shapes. He spoke about democracy, a new Constitution, and a modified federal and parliamentary system. He took steps to stabilize the situation by successfully negotiating the return of the 93,000 prisoners of war and a peaceful settlement with India. He took steps to ameliorate poverty and to revitalize the economy, industry and agriculture. He gave the third Constitution to the country and established civilian authority over the armed forces in the political setup.

In early 1972, Bhutto nationalized ten categories of major industries and withdrew Pakistan from the Commonwealth of Nations and S. E. A. T. O. On March 1, he introduced extensive land reforms. On July 2, 1972, he signed the Simla Agreement with India for exchange of the occupied territories and release of Prisoners of War.

After the 1973 Constitution was promulgated, Bhutto was elected by the House as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was sworn-in on August 14, 1973.

The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report [1971]

In December 1971, within a week of replacing General Yahya as the President, Bhutto formed a commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Hamood-ur-Rahman. The Commission’s responsibility was to ascertain the facts of the 1971 debacle. The commission interviewed 213 persons including General Yahya, Z. A. Bhutto, Chief of Air Force, Chief of Navy, senior commanders, and various political leaders. It submitted its first report in July 1972.

Originally there were 12 copies of the Report. These were all destroyed; expect the one that was handed over to Z. A. Bhutto. Neither Bhutto, nor the Army which took over in 1977, made the Report public. Though the Report remained classified, its contents were presumably learned from various writings and memoirs of the military officers narrating their side of the story of what the Hamood-ur-Rahman Inquiry Commission had to say. The report recommended public trials of the concerned officers responsible for the 1971 debacle.

The inquiry was reopened in 1974. The Commission again interviewed 73 bureaucrats and top military officers and submitted its supplementary report in November 1974. It was this supplementary report that was presumably published by an Indian magazine in August 2000, and afterwards allowed to be published in the Pakistani press. Publicizing of the Report by the Indian media was not a surprise since it had come out at a time when there was international pressure mounting on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Immense human rights violations were being reported by international organizations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch with reference to the role of Indian Security Forces in the Indian-held Kashmir. The publication of the Report was seen in Pakistan as an attempt by India to divert the world attention from its inhumane and unjustified actions in Kashmir.

Volume I of the main report dealt with political background, international relations, and military aspects of the events of 1971. Volume I of the supplementary report discussed political events of 1971, military aspect, surrender in East Pakistan and the moral aspect.

A large number of West Pakistanis and Biharis who were able to escape from East Pakistan told the Commission awful tales of the atrocities at the hands of the Awami League militants. It was revealed that many families of West Pakistani Officers and other ranks serving with East Bengal Units were subjected to inhuman treatment. Their erstwhile Bengali colleagues had butchered a large number of West Pakistani Officers.

As the tales of slaughter reached West Pakistani soldiers of other Units, they reacted violently, and in the process of restoring the authority of the Central Government, committed severe excesses on the local Bengali population. The Report’s findings accuse the Army of carrying out senseless and wanton arson, killings in the countryside, killing of intellectuals and professionals and burying them in mass graves, killing of Bengali Officers and soldiers on the pretence of quelling their rebellion, killing East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists, raping a large number of East Pakistani women as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture, and deliberate killing of members of the Hindu minority.

Having dealt with the claim of General Niazi that he had no legal option but to surrender, the Commission proceeded to consider whether it was necessary for General Niazi to surrender, and whether he was justified in surrendering at that particular juncture, for most of the messages that emanated from the General Head Quarters were studiously ambiguous and designed. Secondly, General Farman Ali had suggested to him that instead of ordering surrender en masse, he should leave it to each Divisional Commander to surrender or not, according to his own circumstances. It was pointed out in the Report, that despite the assurances given by the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and the terms of surrender, the killing of loyal East Pakistani population, West Pakistani civilians, and civil armed forces by the Mukti Bahini started in full swing soon after Army’s surrender.

It was maintained in the Report that the defeat suffered by the armed forces was not a result of military factors alone, but had been brought about as the cumulative result of political, international, moral and military factors. The political developments that took place between 1947 and 1971, including the effects of the two Martial Law periods, hastened the process of political and emotional isolation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan.

The dismemberment of Pakistan was also accelerated by the role played by the two major political parties, Awami League and the Pakistan Peoples Party, in bringing about a situation that resulted in postponement of the National Assembly session, scheduled to be held at Dhaka on the March 3, 1971. The events occurring between March 1 and 25, 1971, when the Awami League had seized power from the Government, resulting in the military action of March 25, 1971, were deplorable. The Commission also touched upon the negotiations, which General Yahya Khan was pretending to hold during this period with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman on the one hand, and political leaders from West Pakistan on the other. Although he never formally declared these negotiations to have failed, yet he secretly left Dhaka on the evening of March 25, 1971, leaving instructions behind for military action to be initiated as soon his plane landed at Karachi.

The Commission declared that military action could not have been substitute for a political settlement, which was feasible once law and order had been restored within a matter of few weeks after the military action. No serious effort was made to start a political dialogue with the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan. Instead fraudulent and useless measures were adopted. The use of excessive force during the military action had only served to alienate the sympathies of the people of East Pakistan. The arbitrary methods adopted by the Martial Law Administration in dealing with respectable citizens of East Pakistan and their sudden disappearances made the situation worse. The attitude of the Army authorities towards the Hindu minority also resulted in a large-scale exodus to India.

Although General Yahya Khan was not totally unaware of the avowed intention of India to dismember Pakistan, he didn’t realize the need for early political settlement with the political leaders of East Pakistan. There was wastage of considerable time during which the Indians mounted their training program for the Mukti Bahini and freely started guerillas raids into the Pakistan territory. Pakistan Army was almost unable to prevent infiltration of Mukti Bahini and Indian agents all along the borders of East Pakistan. In the presence of these two factors, the Pakistan Army was obviously fighting a losing battle from the very start.

There had been a large exodus of people from East Pakistan to India, as a result of the military action. The results of Indian efforts to propagate this refugee problem on an international level cannot be undermined. The Indian propaganda was so forceful that all endeavors made by the military regime in Pakistan to defuse the situation proved to be futile and left the world unimpressed. The mutual assistance treaty signed between India and the U. S. S. R. in August 1971 further aggravated the situation.

No rational explanation was available as to why General Yahya did not take the dispute to the Security Council immediately after the Indian invasion of East Pakistan on November 21, 1971. Nor was it possible to explain his refusal to accept the first Russian resolution, if indeed the situation in East Pakistan had become so critical that surrender was inevitable. The Army High Command did not carry out any in-depth study of the effect of these new factors, nor did it pay any attention to the growing disparity in war preparedness and capability between the armed forces of Pakistan and India as a result of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971.

The traditional concept of defense adopted by the Pakistan Army that the defense of East Pakistan lays in West Pakistan was never implemented in a determined and effective manner. The concept remained valid, and if ever there was need to invoke this concept, it was on November 21, 1971, when Indian troops crossed the East Pakistan borders in naked aggression. Unfortunately, the delay in opening the Western front and the half-hearted and hesitant manner in which it was ultimately opened only helped in precipitating the catastrophe in East Pakistan. Besides, the detailed narrative of events, as given in the supplementary report, clearly shows that the planning was hopelessly defective. There was neither any plan at all for the defense of Dhaka, nor any concerted effort to stem the enemy onslaught with a Division or a Brigade battle at any stage. It was only when the General found himself gradually being surrounded by the enemy which had successfully reached Faridpur, Khulna, Daudkandi and Chandpur (the shortest route to Dhaka), that he began to make frantic efforts to get the troops back for the defense of Dhaka.

The Report maintained that there was no actual order to surrender. In view of the desperate picture painted by the Commander Eastern Command, higher authorities gave him permission to surrender if he, in his judgment, thought it necessary. General Niazi could have opted not to surrender if he thought that he had the capability of defending Dhaka. On his own estimate, he had 26,400 men to hold out for another two weeks. The enemy would have taken a week to build up its forces and another week to reduce the fortress of Dhaka. But evidence showed that he had already lost the will to fight after December 7, 1971, when his major fortresses at Jessore and Brahmanbari had fallen. Detailed accounts of witnesses given to the Commission indicate that Lt-General Niazi had suffered a complete moral collapse during the closing phases of the war.

It had been concluded that apart from the political, international and military factors, an important cause for defeat of the Pakistan Army was the lack of moral character and courage in the senior Army Commanders. The process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the armed forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958. These tendencies were intensified when General Yahya Khan imposed Martial Law in the country once again in March 1969. A large number of senior army officers had not only indulged in large-scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and lewd ways of life, which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership. It appears that they had lost the will to fight and the ability to take vital and critical decisions required for the successful prosecution of the war. These remarks particularly applied to General Yahya Khan, his close associates, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Major General Khuda Dad Khan and Lt-General A. A. K. Niazi, apart from certain other officers. The Commission recommended that these grave allegations be dealt with seriously.

The surrender in East Pakistan had been a tragic blow to the nation and had caused, not only dismemberment of Pakistan, but also shattered the image of Pakistan Army as an efficient and excellent fighting force. In the end it was hoped in the Report that the Nation would learn the necessary lessons from these tragic events, and that effective and early action will be taken in the light of the conclusions reached.

The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report is a valuable document. It was prepared with the explicit purpose of not repeating the various mistakes committed by the Army, General Yahya Khan and Z. A. Bhutto, which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan. Writings and memoirs disclose that apart from its inquiry into the 1971 crisis, it also makes thoughtful recommendations about the defense of the country as a whole.